MIDDLE WESTERN NEWSPAPERS AND THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR, 1895-1898

By George W. Auxier

American historians have long emphasized the important part played by American newspaper propaganda in precipitating the Spanish-American War. This emphasis has resulted primarily from the assumption—arrived at post hoc propter hoc—that the sensational methods employed by William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer, in their ruthless exploitation of the Cuban crisis for purposes of increased circulation of their respective papers in New York City, were universally imitated by the newspapers throughout the "entire" United States and that sensational journalism was accordingly the paramount factor which culminated in war with Spain over the Cuban question. This view has not only persisted rather generally among authorities on recent American history, but has been perpetuated by even those students who, during recent years, have made special studies of the causal relationship between American newspaper opinion and the war of 1898.¹ These studies, however, have been too restricted as to area to justify the generalizations ventured, or too limited in scope to show this relationship accurately. A more satisfactory interpretation of this question is, therefore, dependent upon additional investigations of newspaper opinion for all sections of the United States. In an attempt partially to answer this need, the results here summarized were derived from an intensive analysis of the editorial policies of a group of

representative newspapers in a large and important area — the Middle West.²

Although it is difficult to make generalized statements regarding the exact influence of middle western newspapers in bringing about the Spanish-American War, their editorial comment would seem to indicate that they contributed to that end. Their chief influence, however, was not effected through sensational journalism — as the surveys previously made have assumed — but rather through continued emphasis on a number of basic factors which led to war. These were: the fundamental interests of the United States in the Caribbean, Spanish violations of these interests, the propaganda activities of the Cuban Junta, and the implications of the Cuban question in the domestic politics of the United States.

The basic interests of the United States in the Caribbean were reflected in the editorial columns of middle western newspapers during the first year of the Cuban revolt. Embodied in the premises of the revived spirit of "manifest destiny," these interests were stated in terms of economic imperialism, military strategem, political idealism, and a large measure of humanitarianism. These were the fundamental considerations which determined editorial attitude on the Cuban question. These were the cornerstones upon which the future Cuban policy of the United States seems to have rested. Upon them the editors were stimulated by events and circumstances to prepare the way for their realization through the medium of national policy.

From the beginning of the Cuban revolt in February, 1895, the editors of middle western newspapers pointed out that Spain violated American interests in the Caribbean and that her presence in that area was inimical to the consummation of America's "manifest destiny."³ An interesting and effective repertoire of

² George W. Auxier, "The Cuban Question as Reflected in the Editorial Columns of Middle Western Newspapers, 1895-1898" (unpublished doctoral thesis, Ohio State University Library, Columbus, 1938). The survey included more than forty of the leading Republican, Democratic, and Independent journals distributed throughout the Middle West. Obviously, however, only typical citations can be made in this brief conspectus.

³ Des Moines Iowa State Register, March 9, 1895; Detroit Journal, March 2, 1895; St. Louis Globe-Democrat, March 21, 1895; Sioux City Journal, May 10, 1895; Indianapolis Journal, September 21, 1895. For the ideological basis of the revival of
editorial arguments was accordingly evolved to prove these con-
tentions. American economic interests were said to be jeopar-
dized by the interruption of trade, the destruction of American
property in the islands, and Spanish resistance to the natural
expansion of industrial capitalism. American interests in
military strategy and national security were said to be endan-
ergized because Spain’s strategic possessions in the Caribbean
might fall into the hands of a stronger European power. The
interests of the United States in the extension of the American
political system were said to be obstructed by the “political
anachronism” of monarchical Spain in the democratic western
hemisphere. Through editorial, cartoon, and indigenous verse,
the editors also maintained that Spain violated the American
conception of humanitarianism by her constant abuse of Amer-
ican nationals as well as her own downtrodden subjects. Couched
in emotionalized terminology, these arguments contributed to
the belief that Spain should be eliminated from the Caribbean,
where the United States wanted to broaden her sphere of influ-
ence.

The development of a more aggressive Cuban policy was also

“manifest destiny” during the 1890’s, see: Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898
(New York, 1936), 1-33, and Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny: A Study in

4 Sioux City Journal, October 2, 1895; Chicago Times-Herald, May 21, 1896;
Indianapolis Journal, October 14, 1895; St. Paul Pioneer Press, February 8, 1896;
Columbus Evening Dispatch, April 3, 1896; St. Louis Republic, April 18, 1895; Cin-
cinnati Enquirer, June 12, 1895; Louisville Courier-Journal, June 13, 1897.

5 Minneapolis Journal, April 4, 1895; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, November
16, 1896; Milwaukee Sentinel, September 5, 1895; Des Moines Iowa State Register,
April 4, 1895. The chief exponent of America’s strategic interests in the Caribbean
during this period was Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, retired United States naval
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University Library, Columbus, 1937).

6 Indianapolis Journal, April 12, 1895; Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 17, 1896;
Sioux City Journal, March 17, 1895; Detroit Free Press, August 5, 1895; Chicago
Daily Inter-Ocean, March 9, 1896.

7 Cincinnati Enquirer, December 24, 1895, and January 26, 1896; Columbus Even-
ing Dispatch, March 3, and June 1, 1896; Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 19, 1896,
and March 10, 1897; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, September 4, 1896; Cincinnati
Times-Star, March 7, April 12, and December 11, 1896; St. Louis Globe-Democrat,
May 16, 1896; Kansas City (Mo.) Star, May 9, 1896; Milwaukee Sentinel, February
18, 1897; Omaha World-Herald, March 3, 1897; Chicago Record, February 22, 1897;
Louisville Courier-Journal, January 27, 1897.
stimulated by the activities of the Cuban Junta, whose headquarters were located in New York City, and its American counterpart, the Cuban League, whose branch units were situated in the larger cities throughout the Middle West and elsewhere. These two organizations, working in close cooperation with a sympathetic American press, had as their purpose the instigation of material and moral aid in promotion of Cuban independence. The practical program of these agencies was hypothesized on the premise that their own objectives could be achieved only through assistance from the United States. The Junta, therefore, devised a number of very tangible methods for achieving its purposes.\(^8\)

For the purpose of rendering material aid to the insurgents, the Junta organized and fitted out filibustering expeditions to Cuba.\(^9\) Illegal in character, these enterprises led to a number of exasperating incidents, the most notable of which were the "Allianca" case in 1895\(^10\) and the "Competitor" affair in 1896.\(^11\) The Spanish government made frequent complaints to the American Department of State concerning the illegality of these expeditions,\(^12\) in response to which President Cleveland


\(^12\) *Foreign Relations*, 1895, II, 1193, No. 12, letter 1; *ibid.*, 1896, pp. 696-750; *ibid.*, 1897, pp. 2-5.
issued (June 12, 1895, and July 27, 1896) two proclamations of neutrality. The continuous propaganda of the Junta, nevertheless, moved federal officials and the editors of middle western newspapers to condone the practice of filibustering.

For the purpose of arousing moral support for the insurgent cause, the Junta adopted several methods which disclosed that its members possessed much more than an amateur knowledge of propaganda technique. Through "Sympathy Meetings," the stage, and the platform, the members of the Junta told the story of Cuba's wrongs and her heroic struggle for independence. Through the facilities of a friendly press, American humanitarianism was exploited to the fullest advantage; and through the same medium, the Junta very cleverly developed a belief in Cuban success by lauding the Cuban generals and exaggerating their exploits. The Junta likewise evolved a corresponding theory of Spanish failure by discrediting the Spanish captain-generals in their efforts to suppress the revolt in Cuba and by gloating over Spain's disintegration at home. It also fed the

13 James D. Richardson, *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents* (New York), XII (1917?), 6023-6024; *ibid.*, XII, 6126-6127.


15 For ""Sympathy Meetings"" held in Chicago, Columbus, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, and Detroit, see: *Chicago Daily Inter-Ocean*, June 9, 1897; *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, September 27, 1897; *Columbus Ohio State Journal*, October 2, 1895; *Cincinnati Enquirer*, October 4, 1895; *Indianapolis Sentinel*, December 17, 1896; *Detroit Journal*, February 19, 1898. For theatrical performances and speeches, see: *Cincinnati Commercial Tribune*, October 6, 1895, and April 8, 1898.


17 *Lincoln* (Neb.) *State Journal*, March 19, 1895; *Columbus Evening Dispatch*, July 10, 1895; *Minneapolis Journal*, July 12, 1895; *Chicago Tribune*, November 4, 1897; *St. Paul Pioneer Press*, December 14, 1895; *Milwaukee Journal*, September 21, 1896; *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, August 7, 1896; *Cincinnati Times-Star*, August 29, 1895; *Detroit Free Press*, March 16, 1897; *Columbus Ohio State Journal*, August 12, 1897.
press with atrocity stories based on the alleged brutality of Spanish warfare. It sought further to promote its objectives through the publication of its own paper, *La Patria*, and through the systematic preparation and distribution of a deluge of propaganda pamphlets.

The activities of the *Junta* in thus promoting material and moral aid for the insurgent cause naturally involved the question of American neutrality and eventually led the editors of the Middle West to abandon a policy of non-interference in favor of intervention on behalf of the Cubans. The editorial comment of newspapers in the Middle West also indicated that the *Junta*'s activities were instrumental in pointing out to the Republicans the political implications of the Cuban situation which the Democrats attempted to avoid. In seeking to discredit Cleveland's policy of neutrality the Republicans introduced the Cuban issue into American politics. The editorial columns of the area under consideration indicated that editorial attitude on the issue in question was influenced to a large extent by political considerations. The partisanship which resulted from editorial discussion was a reflection of a struggle between the waning dogma of Democratic isolationism and the rapidly emerging doctrine of Republican imperialism. In this struggle the Cuban question became the issue which determined the trend of American foreign policy. This fact was clearly evident during the administrations of both Cleveland and McKinley.

The partisanship of the Republican press toward Cleveland's

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18 *St. Louis Republic*, December 2, 1896; *Detroit Journal*, February 19, 1897; *Chicago Times-Herald*, September 24, 1895; *Cincinnati Enquirer*, March 1, 1896; *Omaha Daily Bee*, December 14, 1896; *Indianapolis Sentinel*, March 4, 1898.

19 Thomas W. Steep, "Cuban Insurgent Newspapers," *National Magazine* (Boston), VIII, May, 1898, pp. 147-150. In addition to *La Patria* these papers included the following published in Cuba: *El Cubano Libre*, *Boletín de la Guerra*, *La República*, *La Sanidad*, and *La Independencia*. All of them were frequently quoted by the *Junta* in order to give a tone of authenticity to the news which it released to American newspapers. The Hoes Collection in the Library of Congress contains more than a hundred of the *Junta*'s propaganda pamphlets of which the following titles are typical: Enrique José Varona, *Cuba vs. Spain: Manifesto of the Cuban Revolutionary Party to the People of the United States of America* (Pamphlet, n. p., 1895); *Cuba and the United States; Some Pertinent Facts Concerning the Struggle for Independence* (Pamphlet, Atlanta, 1897); Juan Guiteras, *The United States and Cuba* (Pamphlet, Philadelphia, 1895).
policy of neutrality was apparent as early as midsummer, 1895, and became increasingly evident with the approach of the presidential canvas of 1896.\textsuperscript{20} The Democrats so successfully diverted the Cuban controversy that domestic reform and free silver became the leading issues of the campaign.\textsuperscript{21} The Republicans, nevertheless, emphasized the strong Cuban plank in their platform and during the election criticized the Democratic administration for its timidity on that point; but the responsibilities of Republican victory in 1896 sobered the party's attitude toward the Cuban question. Immediately after the election in November, Republican editors reversed themselves and advised a Cuban policy equally as cautious as that which the Democrats had pursued under Cleveland. Yet, ostensibly for purposes of political consistency, the leaders of the Republican party in Congress urged immediate and positive action on the Cuban situation during Cleveland's last Congress, although surreptitiously they tried to thrust the onus of solving the problem upon the outgoing administration.\textsuperscript{22} The Republicans, however, were disappointed in their efforts and received much retributive denunciation from Democratic editors, who pointed out the inconsistencies of their political foes and sought to embarrass them precisely as they had been embarrassed by the Republicans during Cleveland's régime.\textsuperscript{23}

Editorial reaction to McKinley's Cuban policy was, therefore, similar in its political manifestations to that shown in response to the Cuban policy of Cleveland. McKinley's policy was subor-

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Detroit Journal}, August 8, 1895; \textit{Kansas City (Mo.) Journal}, August 26, 1895; \textit{Sioux City Journal}, April 26, 1896; \textit{Cincinnati Times-Star}, August 30, 1895, and March 10, 1896.


\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Milwaukee Journal}, January 10 and March 17, 1897; \textit{Cincinnati Enquirer}, December 8, 1896, and March 4, 1897; \textit{Indianapolis Sentinel}, December 12, 1896; \textit{Detroit Free Press}, November 24, 1896; \textit{Cleveland Plain Dealer}, May 22, 1897; Louisville \textit{Courier-Journal}, March 3, 1897; \textit{Minneapolis Journal}, March 5, 1897.
dinated, however, to a much more difficult task—that of preserving the integrity of the Republican party.24 The issues of reform and free silver had almost triumphed in 1896, and Bryan and the Democrats announced that these would remain the burning questions of the future.25 Mark Hanna had promised the Republicans continuation of political control by means of a return to prosperity. McKinley chose to accomplish this result through peaceful methods;26 although, in the end, he was encouraged by a series of immediate circumstances to forestall the loss of political power, which threatened in the elections of 1898 and 1900, by resorting to war with Spain. In the meantime he endeavored to facilitate the revival of business by preserving the peace and accordingly, in the fall of 1897, the President suggested that Spain attempt the solution of the Cuban question through the inauguration of a program of autonomous reforms for Cuba.

In addition to autonomy a wide variety of proposals for the solution of the Cuban question had been given editorial consideration between February, 1895, and October, 1897. These proposals included neutrality, purchase, arbitration, recognition of Cuban belligerency or independence, charitable intervention, and intervention for the protection of American life and property. For one reason or another, each of these proposals failed. Autonomy also failed, at first because it was rejected by Spain, and later because the United States refused to assist Spain in its effective operation.27 Neutrality was abandoned because it seemed inconsistent with the realization of American interests in the Caribbean.28 Purchase was cast aside because Spain gave no intimation that she would sell Cuba to the United States.29 Arbitration was discarded because the editors considered the

25 William J. Bryan, "Has the Election Settled the Money Question?" *ibid.*, CLXIX, December, 1896, pp. 703-710.
27 *Foreign Relations*, 1896, xxix-xxxvi; *ibid.*, 1897, pp. 540-544 and 548; *ibid.*, 1898, pp. 558, 581-589.
Cuban question an American affair, while recognition of belligerency or independence, although given serious consideration, was not accorded because the insurgents were unable to prove that their de facto government was worthy of de jure status.\textsuperscript{30} Charitable intervention to assist the starving Cubans and intervention for the protection of American life and property proved nothing more than entering wedges for official intervention by force of arms.\textsuperscript{31}

Although there was no universal agreement on any one of the proposals discussed, the editors stood on common ground in consistently advocating Cuban independence through "intervention" of some sort. Western newspaper opinion, between the autumn of 1897 and the spring of 1898, indicated that intervention did not necessarily mean intervention by force. Editorial comment on the events associated with the Cuban revolt, nevertheless, supports the thesis here presented — that the fundamental interests of the United States in the Caribbean, Spanish violations of these interests, propaganda activities of the Cuban Junta, and the political implications of the Cuban question in the domestic politics of the United States — were the real causes which led to war with Spain. These factors were particularly revealed in journalistic comment on the events immediately preceding the declaration of war. The political factor involved was especially reflected during this period; apparently, it was the force that determined McKinley's action.

A number of immediate considerations gave McKinley moral courage to pursue forceful intervention for reasons of political expediency. More specifically these were the De Lôme letter, the "Maine" tragedy, Senator Redfield Proctor's report on Cuban


\textsuperscript{31} Cong. Record, 55 Cong., 1 Sess., XXX, pt. 1, p. 1080; Senate Documents, 55 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 86; \textit{ibid.}, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 230; Millis, Martial Spirit, 92; Columbus Evening Dispatch, May 21, 1897; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, January 25 and March 7, 1898; Columbus Ohio State Journal, February 23, 1898; Detroit Free Press, March 22, 1898; Cleveland Leader, March 20, 1898; Chicago News, January 25, 1898.
conditions, the report of the Naval Court of Inquiry on the causes for the "Maine" disaster, and the probability of European quiescence at American intervention in Cuba. But the tide of intervention did not set in until mid-March, 1898; and McKinley was largely responsible for shaping the events that finally culminated in war. The objective manner in which the editors of middle western newspapers suspended judgment on the insulting De Lôme letter and the "Maine" disaster showed that war, as far as they were concerned, was not a necessity on account of those incidents alone. Their progressive and continued emphasis on the basic interests of the United States in the Caribbean, their repeated laments that Spain violated these interests, the manner in which they served as a vehicle for the propaganda of the Cuban Junta, and the evident partisanship reflected in their discussions of the Cuban question, all suggest that the true causes which led to war were more fundamentally these factors than the influence of the press in demanding intervention in a sensational manner for reasons of increased circulation of the newspapers.

32 Proctor delivered his speech in the Senate on March 17, 1898. For its effect on the editorial attitude of middle western newspapers, see: Dubuque (Ia.) Daily Telegraph, March 17, 1898; Topeka (Kan.) Daily Capital, March 19, 1898; Columbus Ohio State Journal, March 19, 1898; Milwaukee Sentinel, March 19, 1898; Chicago Times-Herald, March 19, 1898; Louisville Times, March 18, 1898. The Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry upon the Destruction of the Battleship Maine (Washington, 1898) was submitted to Congress by McKinley on March 28, 1898. For middle western opinion on the attitude of Europe toward American intervention in Cuba, see: Omaha World-Herald, December 8, 1895; Detroit Free Press, December 29, 1896; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, October 2, 1897; Cincinnati Enquirer, March 13, 1898; Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 15, 1898; Cleveland Leader, March 11, 1898.

33 See the following for comment on the DeLôme letter: Dubuque Daily Times, February 11, 1898; Kansas City (Mo.) Journal, February 10, 1898; Omaha Daily Bee, February 11, 1898; Des Moines Iowa State Register, February 11, 1898; Cleveland Leader, February 11, 1898; Milwaukee Sentinel, February 12, 1898; Louisville Courier-Journal, February 16, 1898. For editorial reaction to the "Maine" incident see: Cedar Rapids Daily Gazette, February 16, 1898; Dubuque Daily Telegraph, February 17, 1898; Topeka Daily Capital, February 18, 1898; Cleveland Leader, February 15, 1898; Indianapolis Journal, February 18, 1898. See also: London Spectator, LXXX, April 9, 1898, p. 501.

34 A decided provincial antipathy to the "yellow sheets" of the East was shown by most of the middle western newspapers throughout the course of the Cuban revolt. See, for example: Columbus Evening Dispatch, September 5, 1895; Columbus Ohio State Journal, November 30, 1897; Indianapolis Sentinel, April 10, 1898; Denver
As further proof of this thesis one needs only to examine the editorial attempts of middle western newspaper editors to rationalize the war in April, 1898. Then the editors restated the fundamental interests of the United States as implied in the revived spirit of "manifest destiny." They reiterated these interests in the impelling tenets of American economic imperialism, military strategy, political idealism, and humanitarianism.\(^{35}\) They recapitulated Spanish violations of the foregoing American interests. They reflected the undoubted influence of the _Junta's_ propaganda, which emphatically declared, through the medium of the press, that the insurgents would not accept any solution of the Cuban crisis short of complete independence. In this rationalization the political implications of the Cuban question in bringing about the Spanish-American War were most manifest.\(^{36}\) Thus it appears that a definitive interpretation of the relationship between the causes of the Spanish-American War and American newspapers must await an analysis of newspaper opinion for the entire United States.

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*Post*, April 5, 1898; *Indianapolis Journal*, April 21, 1898; Chicago Daily Inter-Ocean, April 9, 1898; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, March 26, 1898; Cincinnati Enquirer, February 20, 1898; Cleveland Leader, April 2, 1898; Detroit Free Press, May 21, 1898; Chicago News, March 12, 1898; Cincinnati Times-Star, March 8, 1898; Louisville Courier-Journal, November 8, 1898; Chicago Times-Herald, February 19, 1898. The *Chicago Tribune* was a notable exception.

\(^{35}\) _St. Paul Dispatch*, February 24, 1898; *Milwaukee Sentinel*, February 28, 1898; *Indianapolis Journal*, March 31 and April 15, 1898; Cleveland Leader, March 23, 1898; *Dubuque Daily Telegraph*, April 12, 1898; *Louisville Times*, March 26 and April 18, 1898; Chicago Daily Inter-Ocean, April 2, 1898; Detroit Free Press, April 27, 1898; *Denver Post*, April 12, 1898; Cincinnati Enquirer, March 9, April 4, and 21, 1898; *Milwaukee Journal*, April 18, 1898; Chicago Record, April 20, 1898; Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 8, 1898; Louisville Courier-Journal, March 28 and April 20, 1898; *Omaha World-Herald*, April 20, 1898; *Cedar Rapids Daily Gazette*, April 21, 1898; *Minneapolis Journal*, April 7, 1898; *Chicago News*, March 29, 1898.

\(^{36}\) *Milwaukee Journal*, April 7, 1898; Columbus Evening Dispatch, April 9, 1898; Cincinnati Enquirer, March 11, 1898; Chicago Times-Herald, March 4, 7, and 8, 1898; Dubuque Daily Telegraph, April 14, 1898; Cleveland Leader, February 27, March 22, and April 1, 1898; *Milwaukee Sentinel*, March 23, 1898; *Detroit Journal*, April 5, 1898; Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 1, 1898; Louisville Courier-Journal, April 11, 1898; Topeka Daily Capital, April 15, 1898; *Denver Post*, April 8, 1898.
opinion for the entire United States. The evidence here presented pertains only to the Middle West; the conclusions reached here apply only to that area. Similar studies for the deep South, the Atlantic seaboard, and the Far West must serve as a basis for any sound generalization on the subject as a whole. Until these have been made, it will be impossible to determine the true relationship of the American newspaper press, sensational and otherwise, to American intervention in the Cuban crisis of 1898.