THE VERACRUZ EXPEDITION OF 1847

By K. Jack Bauer*

The failure of President James K. Polk to secure a negotiated peace with Mexico during the summer and fall of 1846 led to the November 17 decision in favor of an advance on Mexico City. After canvassing possible invasion routes only one was found practicable: a landing at Veracruz followed by an advance overland to the Mexican capital. The projected expedition was not only the most ambitious military operation yet undertaken by the United States but also involved America’s first large scale amphibious operation.

During the middle of the nineteenth century amphibious operations were still a terra incognita. No operational doctrine yet existed and special purpose landing craft were all but unknown. Nearly all previous landings had taken place in protected waters from ship’s boats. Such protected waters did not exist around Veracruz.

Veracruz was considered by many to be the strongest fortified point in North America. A walled town of about 15,000 people, it lay on a sandy strip of coast about 450 miles south of the mouth of the Rio Grande. About half a mile offshore, in front of the town, Gallegos Reef broke the swell and formed a small but insecure harbor. On the inshore tip of the reef stood the massive fortress of San Juan de Ulloa commanding both the town and harbor. Veracruz lay in the midst of the yellow fever belt, forcing an invading army to seize Veracruz and Ulloa in time to move inland before the arrival of the disease season in late April or early May.

The command of this very ambitious and extremely difficult undertaking went to Major General Winfield Scott. Although he was without a doubt America’s ablest and most distinguished soldier, his choice was not a congenial one to Polk who distrusted Scott as a professional soldier and as a Whig. But, no other general of sufficient stature or ability was acceptable either. To Polk’s credit, it must be said that once appointed he supported Scott fully.

Before leaving for the south Scott outlined

---

*Dr. Bauer is on the staff of the Historical Branch, U.S. Marine Corps, and is also Assistant Treasurer of the American Military Institute.


his requirements for the coming campaign: 14,000 men, 140 surfboats to land his army, a large siege train, and fifty transports to lift his force.\(^6\) Although the bulk of the men could be drawn from General Zachary Taylor’s army in Northern Mexico part of the men and nearly all the material and transport had to come from the States. These were the responsibility of Secretary of War William L. Marcy and the War Department. Scott believed that with reasonable luck he could have his expedition afloat by the middle of January 1847.\(^7\)

Scott’s flatboats, or surfboats, are of some interest. They were the first specialized landing craft built in the United States. Built in three sizes, thirty-five to forty feet long they were double-ended, flat-bottomed craft carrying thirty-five to forty-five men.\(^8\) Although slow and cumbersome they served their purpose well.

Scott left Washington for the south November 23, 1846, travelling via New York, and reached New Orleans December 19.\(^9\) While at New Orleans Scott fixed the island of Lobos, off the Mexican coast between Tampico and Veracruz, as point of rendezvous for his forces and set early February as target date for beginning the expedition.\(^10\)

He ordered 2500 of the men from Taylor’s army to embark at the Brassos Santiago at the mouth of the Rio Grande and 5500 to embark at the newly captured port of Tampico.\(^11\) The additional troops (newly raised volunteers) and material from the States were to proceed directly to Lobos.\(^10\) The troops at Brassos Santiago and Tampico were ready to embark by the last of January but a shortage of transports delayed their embarkation for nearly a month.\(^12\) The troops and material from the States were equally slow in arriving. When Scott reached Lobos on February 21, 1847, he found only parts of his five new volunteer regiments had arrived and when the bulk of the troops from the Brassos Santiago and Tampico arrived a week later he had less than 9,000 of his expected 14,000 men.\(^13\) Even more critical was his shortage of ordnance and the absence of half his surfboats.\(^14\) These shortages were due to a number of reasons. Bad weather and a shortage of crews held up many of the transports for almost a month; ten transports were cancelled through a misunderstanding between Scott and the War Department; and some of the shortages appear to have been caused by dilatory actions in Washington.\(^15\)

---


\(^7\)Scott, “Vera Cruz and Its Castle,” pp. 1271-1272.


---

\(^11\)Ripley, The War with Mexico, II, 16; J. Jacob Oswandel, Notes on the Mexican War (Philadelphia, 1885), p. 59; Smith, War with Mexico, I, 368, II, 17; “List of transports, showing number & class of troops in each,” Conner Manuscripts.

\(^12\)Scott, Lobos, to Conner, February 26, 1847, David Conner Papers; Scott, Lobos, to Marcy, February 28, 1847, House Executive Document 60, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 896-897.

\(^13\)Jesup to Marcy, April 17, 1848, loc. cit. The dilatoriness was particularly bad in the Navy Department
The advent of the yellow fever season loomed large in Scott’s plans for he must complete his campaigning in the Veracruz area before the scourge’s arrival around the first of May. Already his expedition was a month late. “Indeed,” Scott wrote the Secretary of War on the last day of February, “the season has already advanced, in reference to the usual return of the yellow fever on this coast, that I can only wait a day or two longer for... any body [of troops]... or for anything behind; and two thirds of the ordnance and ordnance stores, and half the surfboats, are yet unheard of.” Two days later Scott led his transports south towards the navy’s base at Anton Lizardo south of Veracruz.

Meanwhile Commodore David Conner, commanding the American naval forces in the Gulf of Mexico, strengthened his squadron for the descent. Although none of the promised reinforcements from the States had arrived he called in every possible vessel from his blockade of the long Mexican coast. By stripping his blockading forces Conner was able to concentrate two frigates, three sloops-of-war, one large steamer, a brig, three steam gunboats and five schooner gunboats off Veracruz. In expectation of Scott’s arrival Conner stationed vessels off the entrance to Anton Lizardo to furnish pilots and instructions to the incoming transports. Scott’s which failed to despatch any of the vessels intended to strengthen Commodore Conner’s squadron in time to take part in the operation. The apologia for the Navy Department’s slowness is found in Commodore Charles Morris, Washington, to Conner, March 4, 1847, Conner Manuscripts.

16 Scott to Marcy, February 28, 1847, loc. cit.
18 Log of U. S. S. Porpoise, National Archives; Log of U. S. S. Raritan, National Archives; Log of U. S. S. Reefer, National Archives; Log of U. S. S. Vixen, National Archives.
19 Conner, Raritan, Anton Lizardo, to Captain John transports, scattered by a gale, began arriving during the morning of March 4.

During March 5 Scott arrived and immediately conferred with Conner. They agreed on the importance of an early landing, “it being important that we should effect a landing before a norther should come on, as this would delay us two or three days.” The following morning Scott with his generals and staff joined Conner on board the small steamer Petrita for an inspection of the possible landing beaches. Following the shoreline north towards Vera Cruz they came within range of the guns of Ulloa which bracketed the frail steamer before Lieutenant Samuel Lockwood could haul out of range unscathed. Scott and Conner agreed that the best landing place would be on Collado Beach about two and a half miles southeast of Veracruz where Sacrificios Island offered some protection for the transports and landing craft. A curving sandy beach with a gentle sloping approach and a range of low sand hills about 150 yards inland, Collado appeared undefended.

Scott’s original plan for the landing called for transferring his men from their transports directly to the landing craft off the landing beach while the navy stood by to H. Aulick, February 27, 1847, Conner Letter Book; W. S. Lott, “The Landing of the Expedition against Vera Cruz in 1847,” Military Service Institution of the United States (61 vols.; New York, 1879-1917), XXIV, (1899), 423.
20 Log of Porpoise; Log of U.S.S.Potomac National Archives.
21 The sudden and extremely violent northerly gales of the Gulf of Mexico.
give gunfire support. However, the anchorage behind Sacrificios was too small to hold both the transports and the naval covering force. Therefore, Scott, of necessity, accepted Conner’s suggestion that the men be embarked on the naval vessels and the army’s few steam transports for the trip to Sacrificios. At the same time Conner agreed to man the surfboats and superintend the landings.

Scott organized his army into three brigades: about 2595 regulars under Brigadier General William J. Worth constituted the first; about 2465 regulars under Brigadier General David E. Twiggs the second; and about 3530 volunteers made up of the third under command of Major General Robert Patterson. Worth’s First Brigade, strengthened by the marines from Conner’s squadron, formed the first landing wave; Patterson’s brigade the second; while Twigg’s regulars remained in reserve.

Conner had the responsibility of assigning the vessels to carry Scott’s force from Anton Lizardo to the anchorage off Sacrificios. He distributed Worth’s brigade between the frigate Raritan, the screw sloop Princeton, and the army steamer Edith; Patterson’s among the frigate Potomac and the army steamers Virginia and Alabama; and the reserve among the sloops of war Albany and St. Mary’s, the brig Porpoise, the small steamer Petrita, and the army steamers Massachusetts and Eudora.

The landings were set for March 8 but a falling barometer during the evening before caused Conner to postpone the landings for fear that a norther was approaching. As the norther did not appear he rescheduled the landings for the following day, March 9—the thirtieth anniversary of General Scott’s reaching flag rank.

At daylight on the ninth the surfboats began the ferrying of troops from their transports to the warships and steamers. Completing their mission about 10:00 A.M. the empty surfboats then made fast to the steamers for the tow to Sacrificios. At 9:45 the schooner-gunboats Reefer, Bonita, Petrel, Tampico, and Falcon of the inshore covering force hoisted anchor and stood up for the landing area. About an hour and three quarters later the remainder of the attack force, led by Conner in the Raritan and Scott in the Massachusetts, exited in single file through the narrow entrance to Anton Lizardo and stood north towards the landing area.


26 Conner, Raritan, Anton Lizardo, to Captain French Forrest, March 7, 1847, Conner Letter Book; Raphael Semmes, Service Afloat and Ashore During the Mexican War (Cincinnati, 1851), p. 125; Smith, War with Mexico, II, 25; Lott, “Landing of the Expedition against Vera Cruz,” p. 424.


28 Scott, General Order No. 45, loc. cit.


32 B. Robertson, Reminiscences of a Campaign in Mexico; by a Member of the “Bloody First” (Nashville, 1849), p. 217; Log of U. S. S. Princeton, National Archives; Log of U. S. S. St. Mary’s, National Archives; Log of Raritan.

33 Conner to Commanding Officers of Potomac, Albany, etc., loc. cit.; Scott, General Order No. 45, loc. cit.; Journal of a Cruise in the . . . Fredonia.

34 Log of Reefer.

35 Log of Potomac; Log of Albany; Log of Princeton; Log of Spitfire; Semmes, Service Afloat and Ashore, pp. 115-116; Smith, War with Mexico, II, 25.
The schooner-gunboats anchored off Col-lado Beach at about 12:15 P.M. and soon afterward the rest of the expedition began arriving.\(^{36}\) It was nearly 3 o'clock before the last of the vessels had taken its assigned place.\(^{37}\) At 3:30 the schooner-gunboats and the light draft steamers \textit{Spitfire} and \textit{Vixen} shifted their positions to form a line about ninety yards off the beach.\(^{38}\) At the same time Scott hoisted the signal to commence loading the surfboats.\(^{39}\) As the boats filled they attempted to form a line abreast of the \textit{Princeton}, about 450 yards offshore, but the strong current setting in around Sacrificios threw the heavily laden boats into confusion. In an attempt to remedy the situation the \textit{Princeton} at about four o'clock threw out a hawser to which the surfboats made fast.\(^{40}\) The surfboats were hopelessly confused and rather than delay the landings to reform his boats General Worth contented himself with arranging his regimental colors in the line of battle and instructing the surfboats to form on them when cast off for the landing.\(^{41}\)

The confusion among the surfboats took on a greater significance when the lookouts in the squadron reported a large cavalry patrol in the dunes behind the beach\(^{42}\)—a seemingly certain indication that the Mexicans would oppose the landings.

At 5:30 the \textit{Massachusetts} fired a gun as the signal for the surfboats to cast off and pull for shore.\(^{43}\) After some confusion while the boats found their proper places the line swept in towards the sandy shore. As it neared the beach a gig pulled ahead on the left of the line, grounded on the beach, and a lone figure leaped out and waded ashore, his gold braid glistening in the sun. It was General Worth.\(^{44}\) Quickly the rest of the boats grounded and their passengers waded ashore. To the complete surprise of the Americans, the Mexicans fired not a shot. The first Americans to reach the top of the range of sand hills learned the reason. There were no Mexicans in sight; even the cavalry patrol had disappeared.

The reasons for General Juan Morales' failure to oppose the landing is difficult to understand. He had not been surprised and even a small force should have been able to make the landing very costly. Apparently Morales believed his poorly trained men could not stand up under a bombardment by naval guns and would be so demoralized by it that he would be unable to salvage a sufficient number to man the defenses of the city. Morales had barely enough troops to man his defenses and the loss of more than a very few would have made the defense of Veracruz extremely difficult if not impossible. Apparently also, Morales' strategy was to hold out as long as possible in the defenses of Veracruz in the hope that a relief force could fight its way through to him.\(^{45}\)

\(^{36}\) \textit{Log of Reefer.}

\(^{37}\) \textit{Ibid.; Log of Albany; Log of Potomac; Log of Princeton; Log of Raritan; Log of St. Mary's; Log of Spitfire; Log of Porpoise.}

\(^{38}\) \textit{Log of Reefer; Log of Spitfire; Log of Vixen.}

\(^{39}\) \textit{Owandel, Notes on the Mexican War,} p. 68; \textit{Smith, War with Mexico,} II, 25. Conner, \textit{Home Squadron under Commander Conner,} p. 20, gives the time as 6 o'clock.

\(^{40}\) \textit{Log of Princeton; H. M. Wessels, Camp Washington, to his brother, March 28, 1847, typescript copy in Bancroft Library, University of California; Ripley, \textit{The War with Mexico,} II, 26. See also Scott, \textit{General Order No. 34, loc. cit.}}

\(^{41}\) \textit{Ripley, \textit{The War with Mexico,} II, 26.}

\(^{42}\) \textit{Log of Reefer; Ripley, \textit{The War with Mexico,} II, 23; Smith, \textit{War with Mexico,} II, 26.}

\(^{43}\) \textit{Log of Princeton; Log of Spitfire; Log of Reefer; Temple, "Memoir of the Landing," p. 68; \textit{Semenes Service Afloat and Ashore,} p. 127; \textit{Smith, War with Mexico,} II, 26.}

\(^{44}\) \textit{Owandel, Notes of the Mexican War,} p. 71; William Harwar Parker, \textit{Recollections of a Naval Officer,} 1841-1865 (New York, 1883), p. 84; George T. M. Davis, \textit{Autobiography of the Late Col. Geo. T. M. Davis, Captain and Aide-de-Camp in Scott's Army of Invasion (Mexico)} (New York, 1891), p. 125.

Once the first wave had landed the surfboats returned to load Patterson’s men. Since there had been no opposition no attempt was made to keep a line of battle, or even much order, as the surfboats shuttled back and forth individually, carrying the rest of Scott’s men.\(^46\) The whole army of more than 8600 men was ashore without loss by midnight.\(^47\) Even today this would be no insignificant achievement, but in 1847 it was magnificent.

As soon as the army was ashore the landing of its supplies began.\(^48\) Conner rushed the landing of supplies because the appearance of a norther would seriously delay further unloading. Subsequently, a series of northers lasting from the twelfth to the seventeenth did seriously hamper the landing of supplies.\(^49\)

Under cover of a brief diversionary bombardment of Ulloa by Commander Josiah Tattnall in the light draft steamer Spitfire Scott began his encirclement of Veracruz on the morning of March 10.\(^50\) Three days later it was complete.\(^51\)

Scott’s first siege batteries were ready by March 22. They opened fire the same day in conjunction with a bombardment of the town by the light draft steamers and gun-boats of the squadron.\(^52\) The absence of a large part of the army’s siege train left Scott without sufficient heavy artillery to breach the walls of the town. To remedy this defect he requested the loan of some heavy guns from the navy. Commodore Matthew C. Perry, who had just relieved Commodore Conner, agreed provided the navy should man its guns. Scott concurred.\(^53\)

The navy sent ashore six guns, three eighteen-inch shell guns and three thirty-two pounders.\(^54\) Emplaced in a battery laid out by Captain Robert E. Lee of Scott’s staff, these first fired during the morning of March 24.\(^55\) After three days of action the navy’s heavy guns had nearly breached the western wall of the town.\(^56\)

With the bombardment beginning to show effect General Scott and Commodore Perry readied an assault which never occurred. General Morales called a council of war of his principal officers during the evening of the twenty-fifth. The council advised sur-


\(^{53}\)Conner, Home Squadron under Commodore Conner, p. 77; Smith, War with Mexico, II, 29-30; Semmes, Service Afloat and Ashore, pp. 132-133; William Elliott Griffis, Matthew Calbraith Perry; A Typical American Naval Officer (Boston, 1890), pp. 220-223.

\(^{54}\)Griffis, Matthew C. Perry, p. 226; Parker, Recollections of a Naval Officer, pp. 95-96.


\(^{56}\)Semmes, Service Afloat and Ashore, pp. 135, 141; Carlos Maria de Bustamante, El nuevo Bernal Diaz del Castillo o sea historia de la invasion de los Anglo-
render to save further bloodshed, as the town and its inhabitants had suffered heavily from the pounding of the army’s heavy mortars and howitzers. Morales opposed surrender and resigned his command to General José Juan Landero. The next day Landero opened the negotiations which led to the signing of Articles of Capitulation on March 27. To the pleasant surprise of the Americans, Landero included the Castle of San Juan de Ulloa in his surrender, there-


60 _Articles of Capitulation_, _Vera Cruz_, March 27, by removing Scott’s greatest obstacle. On March 29, a full month before the onset of the yellow fever season, the Americans marched into their prize.

Even if Veracruz was not resolutely defended, and it was not, Scott’s success should not be minimized. He conducted a well planned and well executed operation in spite of disheartening shortages of nearly everything except drive and resourcefulness on the part of the commanding general. He was ably assisted and supported by Commodore Conner whose relief during the siege was unfortunate and has robbed him of the recognition he deserves.

__Placed in Perspective__

Too many Americans react with apathy to the situation confronting us today. They fail to realize how strong America really is, and how much they personally can do to maintain that strength. Although it is only part of wisdom to face frankly what we are up against, there is nothing in the picture which should sap our confidence in ourselves. Can we forget that in Korea 76 communist divisions were hurled into the battle with all the hideous disdain for human life characteristic of the Soviet ideology, and were fought to a standstill by 22 Allied divisions?

We spend far too much time thinking about the power of the Soviet, and far too little time considering the power we have here in America. Let’s turn the situation around. What do the Soviets see when they look at America?

They see a tremendously mighty Nation with a strong, dynamic economy that is a long, long way ahead of theirs. They see a Nation which has the “know how” required to make the most effective use of every scientific discovery. They see a free people joined for nearly two centuries in a spirit of unified endeavor, working with all their zeal toward a common purpose because they believe in it—not because a dictator stands over them with the lash of terror. They see a people of indomitable courage who have risen nobly to every crisis, who have never succumbed to the thought of defeat even with the tides of war running in full flood against them. They see a Nation which is a vital part of the greatest defensive alliance ever created, an alliance which has more military power—more power of every kind—than the whole communist world; they see a Nation that has the resources—physical, spiritual, and psychological—to keep far ahead of any Soviet advance. For every difficulty we have, the Soviets have a thousand.

__1From “Remarks by Secretary of the Army Wilbur Brucker” at the 30th National Convention, Reserve Officers Association, New Orleans, La., reported in _The Reserve Officer_, (August, 1956)._