THE JEFFERSONIAN BACKGROUND OF THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE

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It may be ventured without serious danger of refutation that little remains to be divulged in connection with the immediate circumstances and negotiations relating to the Louisiana Purchase. Much, too, has been published in recent years concerning several aspects of its American background, such as the settlement of the Old Southwest, the Spanish Conspiracy, the Jay and Pinckney treaties, and the equivocal Genét mission. But there exists no entirely satisfactory appreciation of the most vital phase of western history in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the issue whether or not the United States were to enjoy free and untrammeled navigation through the mouth of the Mississippi River.\(^1\) Still less adequately has it been recognized that long before 1803 Thomas Jefferson was the primary statesman in the United States’s struggle for unrestricted use of the greatest river system on the continent, and seldom has it been hinted that he followed for a number of years a systematic policy to attain this national goal.\(^2\)

The question originated in the Treaty of Paris, 1763, by which Spain gained complete control of the mouth of the Mississippi.\(^3\) The issue was not settled until the great acquisition of 1803 opened up to the United States the gateway of American inland commerce at New Orleans.

Though Jefferson was without the personal contacts and interests in the transmontane region which such a man as George Washington had, the foundation of fact beneath his plea for free

\(^1\) Frederick A. Ogg, *The Opening of the Mississippi; a Struggle for Supremacy in the American Interior* (New York, 1904) is the best available study.

\(^2\) A few historians (such as Ogg, Samuel F. Bemis, and Frederick J. Turner) and two of Jefferson’s biographers (Morse and Parton) seem in incomplete measures to suspect its fullness and length. None have noted any of the Jeffersonian materials presented herein dealing with the period prior to 1790.

American navigation of the Mississippi was surprisingly adequate. It consisted primarily of a superior knowledge of western geography. His father, Peter Jefferson, who was prominent among colonial surveyors, knew well all the Alleghany regions south of Pennsylvania. Thus Jefferson may have acquired his considerable interest in American geography from his parent. He was familiar with the maps made by Evans, Hutchins, and others, which served to supplement rather fully his father’s work.4 His Notes on Virginia, written in 1781 largely at the instance of M. Barbé-Marbois,5 who was to be one of the chief French ministers in the Louisiana Purchase negotiations of 1802-1803, is accorded a place among the finest early American geographical treatises.6 In it he described minutely and accurately the location and navigation capacity of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers, including all the tributaries of the latter — even going so far as to indicate the peculiar windings of the Mississippi’s channel within its bed.7 In dealing with the possible connections between the western waters and the Atlantic Ocean he recognized the true importance of the Ohio-Mississippi river system by predicting that it would be used for heavy commodities, such as flour and timber, more than the trans-Alleghany routes which were to be developed in the future.8 In later years he was almost constantly fostering the accumulation of more information in regard to the West, the Lewis and Clark expedition being by no means the only extensive exploration which he planned.9

Then, too, Jefferson’s mental equipment for service to American interests in the Mississippi Valley included a discerning

5 Thomas Jefferson to François Barbé-Marbois, December 20, 1781, in American Historical Review, XII (1907), 75.
7 Albert E. Bergh (ed.), The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Washington, 1904-1905), II, 7-19. There are no unpublished materials bearing on this paper in the various collections of Jefferson MSS.; hence references are given, whenever possible, to the widely available Bergh edition.
8 Ibid., 19-22.
acquaintance with the people of the West. He was rarely nearer the setting sun than his homes, Shadwell and Monticello, on the eastern fringe of the mountains, yet he could boast without exaggeration, "I have had great opportunities of knowing the character of the people who inhabit that country." 10 Throughout his public career he was in frequent communication with the West. He knew its temper and conceived its sectional interests to be synonymous often with national interests — quite pointedly so in the case of commerce upon the Mississippi.

As governor of Virginia Jefferson was first brought officially into contact with the problem of American privileges or rights upon the mighty western stream. A noticeable emigration to the transmontane section of the state was taking place. In the eyes of one who could anticipate the coming decade, it was desirable that these recent settlers on tributaries of the Ohio be allowed navigation without tariffs at New Orleans. In 1779 Jefferson first broached the subject to the Spanish officials at New Orleans by seeking to offer the prospect of a mutual trade in return for free admission to the Gulf of Mexico. Promising that the increasing number of the emigrants would produce valuable commerce for Spain and enumerating fully the necessities which could best be furnished the emigrants by Spanish New Orleans, 11 he wrote to the governor of Louisiana:

Our Vicinity to the State over which you immediately preside; the direct channel of commerce by the River Mississippi, [and] the nature of those Commodities with which we can reciprocally furnish each other, point out the advantages which may result from a close connection, and correspondence. Notwithstanding the pressure of the present War on our people, they are lately beginning to extend their Settlements rapidly on the Waters of the Mississippi; and we have reason to believe, that . . . there will in the Course of another Year, be such a number of Settlers, as to render the Commerce an object worth your notice. 12

Similarly, the governor's instructions to Virginia military

12 Id. to id., November 8, 1779, ibid., 59.
leaders fighting in the West included the commission of building a fort on the Ohio or Mississippi rivers to protect the inland trade.\textsuperscript{13} But no known response was elicited by this invitation to negotiate for mutual benefit, and the duties were continued for fifteen years upon products floated down the river on flatboats for deposit or storage at New Orleans and later transfer to oceanic vessels — when, indeed, the port was not closed entirely to all but Spanish ships.\textsuperscript{14}

While Jefferson was the American minister to Paris, 1784-89, the unsettled international situation impressed itself profoundly on his mind. He drew from his intimate observations of European politics the significant conclusion that sooner or later the youthful and impotent United States might use this international distress and unrest to good advantage in wrestling from England the coveted control of the Northwest posts and from Spain a favorable settlement of the Mississippi navigation controversy.\textsuperscript{15} The confident conviction thus formed is a cardinal key to his service in two later official positions; it received a final and abundant justification in the Louisiana Purchase. Evidences of its slow operation before this successful culmination are numerous.

John Jay's proposal in his negotiations with Gardoqui, 1785, that the United States cease to press for perhaps two or three decades her claim to privileges on the Mississippi in return for special Spanish considerations of a more general commercial nature and for recognition of the disputed thirty-first parallel as the northern boundary of West Florida, stirred the absent Jefferson to write many letters denouncing such a policy in no uncertain terms. The epigrammatic Benjamin Franklin is reported to have made this acute comment to Jay: "I would rather agree with the Spaniards to buy at a great price the whole of their right on the Mississippi, than sell a drop of its waters. A neighbor might as well ask me to sell my street-door.

\textsuperscript{13} E. g., Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Martin, January 24, 1780, \textit{ibid.}, 87; id. to George Rogers Clark, April 19, 1780, \textit{ibid.}, 121.

\textsuperscript{14} Arthur P. Whitaker, \textit{The Spanish-American Frontier, 1783-1795} (Boston, 1927), 7-10, 68, 104. On the volume of the Mississippi trade, 1782-90, see \textit{ibid.}, 95-96.

\textsuperscript{15} Perhaps the best explanation of this reaction is that of Samuel F. Bemis, "'Thomas Jefferson,'" in Samuel Flagg Bemis (ed.), \textit{The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy} (New York, 1927), II, 9-12.

\textsuperscript{16} Quoted in James Parton, \textit{Life of Thomas Jefferson} (Boston, 1874), 641.
son's opinions on the subject were as decided and emphatic as Franklin's, though not so memorably expressed. Jefferson declared that he "could never reconcile" to his "own ideas of probity or wisdom" the principles which had motivated Jay; and again, that the use of the river must be considered a *sine qua non* in any future negotiations with Spain. He was well informed of the separatist movement which Jay's blunder — probably born of desperation though it was — had prompted among the western settlers, and this result was particularly deplorable. When it was suggested that he might be sent to Spain on a special mission, he wrote, on June 20, 1787, that there was no prospect of success in "the proposition of my going to Madrid, to try to recover there the ground which has been lost [by Jay] at New York." To the disgruntled westerners he advised a reasonable degree of moderation and patience:

I should think it proper for the western country to defer pushing their right to that navigation to extremity, as long as they can do without it tolerably; but that the moment it becomes absolutely necessary for them, it will become the duty of the maritime States to push it to every extremity, to which they would their own right of navigating the Chesapeake, the Delaware, the Hudson, or any other water. A time of peace will not be the surest for obtaining this object. Those, therefore, who have influence in the new country would act wisely to endeavor to keep things quiet till the western parts of Europe shall be engaged in war.

Giving expression to an expansionist's dream, he had written in 1786 to another influential Virginian who had recently removed to Kentucky:

We should take care, too, not to think it for . . . [our] interest . . . to press too soon on the Spaniards. Those countries [i.e., Louisiana and West Florida] cannot be in better hands. My fear is, that they are too feeble to hold them till our population can be sufficiently advanced to gain it from them, piece by piece. The navigation of the Mississippi we must have. This is all we are, as yet, ready to receive.

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18 Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, August 11, 1786, *ibid.*, V, 384.
19 In addition to citations immediately preceding and following, see Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, January 30, 1787, *ibid.*, VI, 65-67.
20 Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, June 20, 1787, *ibid.*, VI, 134.
In spite of the pressure of the menacing western suspicion of eastern faith in this matter, there were to be several painful years before the ground "lost at New York" was recovered; and the statesman who correctly analyzed the situation was to play the leading rôle in the dilatory preliminary diplomacy.

Washington’s appointment of Jefferson to serve as his secretary of state was a selection of greatest consequence to the controversy over the navigation of the Mississippi River.\(^{23}\) The necessity of negotiating with Spain was a legacy from the "Critical Period" ranking in importance for the Department of State with the difficult English and French relations of the Federalist period. A notation in one of the president’s diaries shows that Jefferson focused his attention upon the Spanish problem within a month after his arrival at New York.\(^{24}\) Three or four months later European complications arose, and Jefferson worked characteristically to turn them to his advantage. The crux of the matter was the menace of war between England and Spain over the Nootka Sound affair, with the former preparing an expedition in Canada to travel overland to Louisiana and capture New Orleans.\(^{25}\) Open warfare did not materialize, but the obvious danger to the United States should the British conquer Louisiana — for their army and navy would then surround the Union on all sides — was sufficient to keep the pen of the secretary of state quite busy. A remark which has been attributed to Montesquieu reflects American sentiment for more than a decade toward any British or French attempts against New Orleans quite aptly: "It is happy for the commercial powers that God has permitted Turks and Spaniards to be in the world, since of all nations they are the most proper to possess a great empire with insignificance."\(^{26}\) Constant bickerings with Spain were bad enough; to have a more potent southern neighbor would be infinitely worse.

\(^{23}\) The choice of Jefferson in preference to Jay, who might also have been considered a logical candidate, was a reassuring gesture to the West. Whitaker, Spanish-American Frontier, 119-20.


\(^{26}\) Quoted in Parton, Jefferson, 642.
In this vein Jefferson as secretary of state submitted to Washington opinions on America's best course toward Britain in this crisis. The intimations which he sent to the American minister at London are firm enough in their tone, if not indeed in actual phraseology, to be considered justly a presage of the Monroe Doctrine. Instead of seeking an alliance with Spain against the common threat, he proposed to guarantee her claims west of the Mississippi, which Great Britain might otherwise gain by conquest, in return for a cession of New Orleans and West Florida. This might be urged on the ground that dissatisfied westerners, whose rights the United States would never abandon, might precipitate a war against Spain. To the American minister in Paris he pointed out the fact that France would undoubtedly be drawn into the impending war as ally to Spain and that, therefore, French pressure should be exerted on Spain to arrange for the United States an unrestricted navigation of the Mississippi, lest their common foe be augmented by the United States. In a suggestion to France not nearly so bold as that to Spain, a cession of the island of New Orleans, which would wholly fulfil American wishes, might be endorsed by the ally, except that such an idea might now seem extreme; it was nevertheless submitted to France for "future growth" and future intercession. Thus, while the general tenor of Jefferson's policy in 1790 reflected the administration's desire for neutrality in event of war, the secretary attempted to exploit the situation

27 "Opinion on War between Great Britain and Spain," July 12, 1790, Ford, Writings of Jefferson, V, 200; George Washington to Thomas Jefferson, August 27, 1790, and Jefferson's paper of the next day, Bergh, Writings of Jefferson, III, 78-81.

28 "We wish you, therefore, to intimate to them ... that a due balance on our borders is not less desirable to us than a balance of power in Europe has always appeared to them." Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris, August 12, 1790, ibid., VIII, 84-86. Cf. John T. Morse, Thomas Jefferson (Boston, 1885), 235.


30 Thomas Jefferson to William Carmichael, August 2, 1790, Bergh, Writings of Jefferson, VIII, 70-72.

in the interest of the United States by balancing carefully foreign counter-weights.

The years 1791 and 1792 brought less forced but equally forceful and unsuccessful efforts to secure a "final acknowledgment of our right to navigate the Mississippi; a right which has been long suspended in exercise" 32 and which, "with such privileges as to make it useful, and free from future chicane, can be no longer dispensed with on our part." 33 Evidently answering an inquiry from one who was inclined to question the sincerity of the federal government's contest with Spain for an untaxed commercial exit at New Orleans, Jefferson wrote:

I can assure you of the most determined zeal of our chief magistrate in this business, and I trust mine will not be doubted so far as it can be of any avail. The nail will be driven as far as it will go peaceably, and farther the moment that circumstances become favorable.34

To this end the envoy to Spain should endeavor to correct an impression given Madrid officials by Gardoqui that the government was interested in the right only for the sake of the men of the western waters and that the maritime eastern states were not urgently endorsing it.35 France should still be urged to exert an "efficacious interference" for this country on the Spanish court,36 but affairs between the two nations were drifting rapidly in a direction which would render French intercession utterly futile, if not downright destructive.37 When Spain seemed eager for a general commercial treaty, Jefferson modified his instructions without renouncing the navigation claim.38 It appeared

32 Thomas Jefferson to William Carmichael, March 12, 1791, Bergh, Writings of Jefferson, VIII, 143.
33 Thomas Jefferson to William Short, March 12, 1791, ibid., 144.
34 Thomas Jefferson to Harry Innes, March 7, 1791, ibid., 136-37. He did not know of Innes' connection with the Spanish Conspiracy: Samuel F. Bemis, Pinckney's Treaty; a Study of America's Advantage from Europe's Distress, 1783-1800 (Baltimore, 1926), 177.
35 Thomas Jefferson to William Carmichael, April 11, 1791, Bergh, Writings of Jefferson, VIII, 176-77. Jefferson's refutation of this allegation was quite emphatic in its tone.
36 Thomas Jefferson to William Short, March 12, 1791, ibid., 144.
38 "Report relative to negotiations at Madrid," March 7, 1792, Bergh, Writings of Jefferson, III, 199-201.
soon, however, that the Spanish request to treat on a more comprehensive basis was merely a device for protraction. The reconciliation between Great Britain and Spain, which lessened the necessity of an immediate settlement and undermined a primary foundation of Jefferson's diplomacy of the past two or three years, closed for several months negotiations between the two countries. 39

But the most interesting development of these two years was Jefferson's composition of an able state paper enumerating fully the American claims to rights upon the Mississippi. 40 His examination of the treaties of 1763 and of 1782-83 revealed an almost indisputable right to free use of the river, 41 though Spain could not admit all his conclusions in the latter case. Yet, he argued, these rights had an even better foundation in the law of nature and of nations, and he exhibited Roman law and such writers as Grotius and Vattel in support of his contentions. Thus it appeared that the inland inhabitants of a riparian state had a natural right to an unobstructed descent of their river to its mouth, no matter who possessed its shores. 42 The Polish Corridor of the present time represents an interesting disposition of a similar problem in regard to the Vistula River. Either Jefferson was grossly ignorant of such contemporary examples of restricted privilege as the Belgian Scheldt running through Dutch and Spain's own Tagus through Portuguese banks or he avoided purposely any avowal of that knowledge. 43 Yet his logic carried him even further: "The right to use a thing, comprehends a right to the means necessary to its use, and without which it would be useless." 44 Thus he asserted an American right to moor vessels to and unload their cargoes upon Spanish shores in emergencies

40 "Report relative to negotiations with Spain to secure the free navigation of the Mississippi, and a port on the same," December 22, 1791, and March 18, 1792, Bergh, Writings of Jefferson, III, 164 ff.
41 Ibid., 173-76.
and to possess under independent jurisdiction an adequate port and place of deposit within the Spanish boundaries near New Orleans. Finally, the gaining of the untrammeled navigation privileges should not be a grant from Spain, but merely a tardy admission of absolute right. Jefferson's interpretation of American claims to the use of the Mississippi, it has been hinted, were even looser than his construction of the Constitution in the Louisiana Purchase, but none of his contemporaries was equally zealous in pressing what was perhaps a somewhat valid right in support of an undoubtedly vital national interest.

So far as total rather than tacit acquiescence was concerned, France was never reconciled to the Spanish ownership of Louisiana. Jefferson had been aware of this attitude as early as 1790, and had communicated to his subordinate in Paris his knowledge of a specific "project of again engaging France in a colony...on the Mississippi." Three years later the involved Genêt mission to the United States, with its far-flung, secret scheme for the conquest of Louisiana, presented to the secretary of state several difficult problems of policy. Genêt expected much of Jefferson in the way of official sympathy and was quite disillusioned when the former minister to France became too well acquainted with his meteoric plans and turned against him. He would have been a wiser, happier man had he been gifted with the more penetrating insight of one of his successors, who thus delineated the francophile Jefferson:

I do not know whether, as I am told, we will always find in him a man entirely devoted to our interests. Mr. Jefferson likes us because he detests England...Jefferson, I say, is an American, and, by that title, it is impossible for him to be sincerely our friend. An American is the born enemy of European peoples.

In 1793 Jefferson thought at first that France's object was to

47 Bemis, Pinckney's Treaty, 172.
48 Thomas Jefferson to William Short, August 10, 1790, Bergh, Writings of Jefferson, VIII, 81.
‘offer independence to the Spanish-American colonies, beginning with those on the Mississippi’; he was rather inclined to view such a project with favor, for ‘she will not object to . . . [our] receiving those on the east side into our confederation,’ and that would mean free trade for the West upon the river. Several months later he recorded his understanding after a second interview with Genêt that the forces which were to attack New Orleans were to be recruited and organized outside the boundaries of the United States. Yet he wrote at the same time a letter to Governor Shelby of Kentucky introducing a French agent, Michaux, as a botanist and as a man holding Genêt’s confidence to so great an extent was he duped by the treacherous Genêt. The unexpected military activities of Michaux within American boundaries led to a proclamation that no citizen could legally join the French forces. As Jefferson learned gradually that the French intended to control Louisiana instead of fostering its independence — in which case no possibility of free Mississippi navigation would have accrued to the United States — and that hopes of alienating the transmontane populace from loyalty to the Union were being entertained by them, his hostility became open.

Meantime, Spain had appeared momentarily menacing; then American negotiations with the Spanish court had settled back again into the usual dull routine. In November Gardoqui reversed Spanish policy by offering to meet the American navigation and southern boundary claims in return for a formal alliance of the United States with Spain — a price which Washington and his colleagues were then unwilling to pay. Jefferson despaired of making a favorable settlement of these issues before


his intended relinquishment of the portfolio of state, and the President’s message to Congress in December admitted that an impasse had been reached in the negotiations. But some months after the secretary’s resignation a new turn of affairs in Europe promised a real chance of success. Jefferson was asked to go to Madrid as a special envoy; when he declined, Thomas Pinckney hastened across the Atlantic to conclude an agreement by which he gained in the question of Mississippi commerce an untaxed and unlimited freedom of passage between the Spanish shores and a temporary, renewable right of deposit. Despite his absence from administrative position at the time, 1795, it was in a very true sense Jefferson’s policy which secured the long-delayed concessions embodied in the Pinckney Treaty, and much of the credit for this posthumous success is rightfully his. It represented the first great triumph of his reliance upon the quarrels of Europe to unravel the tangled problems of American diplomacy. That he was not wholly satisfied, however, with the result is indicated by his statement that the “Spanish treaty will have some disagreeable features” and by his far-sighted prophecy that “seeds of chicanery & eternal broils, instead of peace & friendship” would be its progeny.

Nevertheless all went well with the trading interests of the Mississippi Valley for four or five years. The written permission covering the right of deposit was allowed to lapse, yet no actual limitations hindered this practice of the river bargemen. But the cession of Louisiana to France by a secret article in the Treaty of San Ildefonso, 1800, was a dire circumstance. At last had come the dreaded acquisition of the natural gateway of the West by a power more aggressive than Spain. Yet France did not attempt

55 Morse, Jefferson, 234-35; Woolery, “The Relation of Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy,” loc. cit., 84.
56 Bemis, Pinckney’s Treaty, 352-53.
57 Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, March 6, 1796, Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VII, 63.
58 Napoleon’s instructions to the agent whom he despatched to assume control of Louisiana, 1802, suffice to indicate the probable trend of French domination there: Turner, “Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley,” loc. cit., 179.
immediate occupation, and the transfer was not even suspected in the United States until eight months later. To the governor of the Mississippi Territory the suspicious President Jefferson wrote during this period of doubt:

With respect to Spain our dispositions are sincerely aimiable and even affectionate. We consider her possession of the adjacent country as most favorable to our interests, & should see, with extreme pain, any other nation substituted for them . . . Should France get possession of that country, it will be more to be lamented than remedied by us.

In violation of the Pinckney Treaty the Spanish officials at New Orleans issued in October, 1802, an order depriving American boatmen of the right of deposit, and the ardor of Jefferson’s disposition toward the southern neighbor cooled noticeably. But by that time it was known that Spain was only a de facto rather than a de jure neighbor.

When he was assured that the rumors of the Spanish cession of Louisiana were not without cause, Jefferson took steps to nullify the secret clause of her agreement with France before actual transfer could be made. All possible efforts were concentrated on Paris. His oft-quoted letter to Livingston, which practically opened the negotiations resulting in the Louisiana Purchase, gives a forceful enunciation of his demand for the United States’s right to an unimpeded traffic upon the Mississippi:

There is on the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. It is New Orleans. . . . France, placing herself in that door, assumes to us the attitude of defiance. . . . We must . . . make the first cannon which shall be fired in Europe the signal for the tearing up any settlement [in Louisiana] she may have made . . . This is not a state of things we seek or desire . . .

If France considers Louisiana, however, as indispensable for her views, she might perhaps be willing to look about for arrangements which might reconcile it to our interests. If anything could do this, it would be the ceding to us the island of New Orleans and the Floridas.

60 Jefferson to W. C. C. Claiborne, July 13, 1801, ibid., 71.
61 The royal order commanding this reversal of Spanish policy was prompted by insistent charges on the part of Spain’s magistracy in Louisiana that the privileges granted in 1795 had been abused and illegally extended by the Americans: E. Wilson Lyon, “The Closing of the Port of New Orleans,” in American Historical Review, XXXVII (1932), 280-86.
62 Thomas Jefferson to Robert R. Livingston, April 18, 1802, Bergh, Writings of
A year of parleying on this basis was ended by Bonaparte's unexpected decision to sell the whole of Louisiana, which soon cleared up beyond further litigation the right of the United States to unrestricted use of the Mississippi River. For a second time Jefferson's patient dependence upon international complications to strengthen the Union had come almost remarkably to the rescue of American diplomatic impotence.

This survey endeavors to place the Jeffersonian background of the Louisiana Purchase in a clearer setting than it has previously received. Jefferson was eminently qualified to direct the negotiations of 1802-1803, for "he had realized longer and proclaimed more persistently the value and possibilities of the great Mississippi Basin than any other man in the public service." He deserves more than the fortuitous honor of being President when the Purchase was made; he had done more than profit from Napoleon's forced abandonment of his colonial empire. No other American had been equally interested in the contest for an unchecked communication by water between the Ohio River and the Gulf of Mexico. He had been the author and chief administrator of the vital policy which led directly to the glorious culmination of 1803. For actually effecting that consummation he deserves comparatively little praise, but credit is justly due to Thomas Jefferson for his services during two decades in preparing for the unexpected Louisiana Purchase. The realization of a cherished dream is none the less welcome because one has dreamed only half of what is attained.

Jefferson, X, 312-15. An important, though unofficial, go-between in the negotiations, who was quite familiar with the President's desire, protested at length against the threatening tone of Jefferson's dispatches, charging that they would make him appear to "prefer a treaty which gives you land rather than a treaty which would guarantee you rights": du Pont de Nemours to Thomas Jefferson, April 30, 1802, Dumas Malone (ed.), Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours, 1798-1817 (Boston, 1930), 52-61. The most recent summary is R. A. McLemore, "Jeffersonian Diplomacy in the Purchase of Louisiana, 1803," in Louisiana Historical Quarterly (New Orleans, 1917-), XVIII (1935), 346-53.